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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN BONDING CO., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MAUREEN NELSON, 
Defendant-Respondent, No. 860050 
and 
KEITH R. NELSON, dba AAA 
ELECTRIC SERVICE, and KEITH 
R. NELSON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the lower court err in dismissing defendant Maureen 
Nelson from liability under the terms of an Indemnification 
Agreement on the grounds that Maureen Nelson received insuffi-
cient notice from the plaintiff relating to her liability? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action originally brought by the plaintiff 
American Bonding Co. against Keith R. Nelson who was the owner 
of AAA Electric Service and against his former wife Maureen 
Nelson. Plaintiff claimed that the defendants, as indemnitors 
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were obligated to reimburse it for sums expended pursuant 
to a surety bond issued for construction work performed by 
AAA Electric Service. Defendants denied any liability and 
asserted that Plaintiff had failed to properly settle the 
outstanding obligations and therefore claimed damages 
against it. 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
This matter was tried to the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
commencing on February 2, 1981. On the second day of trial 
Judge Rigtrup granted defendant Maureen Nelson's Motion to 
Dismiss and removed her from the litigation. The trial con-
tinued for an additional ten days as to the various claims 
and counterclaims of Plaintiff and defendant Keith R. Nelson. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment of 
the Court were ultimately entered on December 13, 1985. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence introduced in the lower court during the 
two-week trial involved an extremely complicated set of facts 
common in construction-type cases. Fortunately, for the 
purposes of this appeal, the facts are extremely simple in 
that the actual construction claims are not at issue. Rather, 
the only facts required to understand this appeal are the 
circumstances relating to the execution of the Indemnification 
Agreement and the subsequent events relating to Plaintiff's 
claim of loss. 
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In September of 1973 defendant Keith R. Nelson was married 
to Maureen Nelson. At that time he had organized his own 
electrical company and was doing business as AAA Electrical 
Service. Because he was required to obtain a surety bond in 
order to perform work at the Salt Lake City International 
Airport, he approached Plaintiff for the purpose of issuing 
such bond. As a condition for issuing a construction bond 
Plaintiff required both Mr. Nelson and his wife to execute a 
"Blanket Indemnity Agreement." A copy of this agreement is 
attached herein as Exhibit A to the Appendix. 
Accordingly, on September 17, 19 7 3 the document was 
executed by Mr. Nelson (as an individual and on behalf of AAA 
Electric Service) and by Maureen Nelson. At trial Mrs. Nelson 
identified her signature but could not specifically recall 
signing the document. (R. 197). During this time, Mr. and 
Mrs. Nelson resided at their Salt Lake City residence at 4265 
South 615 East. 
Subsequently, Mr. Nelson and his company undertook a 
construction project at Stapleton International Airport in 
Denver, Colorado. Again, the plaintiff issued a bond to 
insure the company's performance of the work and payment of 
job obliations. In the latter part of 1975 the plaintiff was 
notified that certain materialmen had not been paid by Nelson 
and that the government was considering a default on the 
project. (R. 88-91) . 
On November 19, 1975 Plaintiff through its executive 
officer sent a letter to both Keith Nelson and Maureen Nelson 
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regarding the claims that had been made to the bonding company. 
The letter to Keith Nelson and the letter to Maureen Nelson 
were both addressed to the same address at 4265 South 615 East 
in Salt Lake City. A copy of the Keith Nelson letter was also 
sent to Maureen Nelson as well as to Dean Vanatta, the attorney 
for American Bonding. A copy of the letter to Maureen Nelson 
was sent to Keith Nelson and also to Mr. Vanatta. The plain-
tiff sent these letters both by certified mail and by regular 
mail. Subsequently, the plaintiff received back unopened both 
of the certified mail letters which had been stamped unclaimed 
together with the certified returns also marked unclaimed. 
The letters sent by regular mail, however, were never returned 
to the plaintiff. (R. 195). Copies of the letters sent to 
Keith Nelson and to Maureen Nelson are attached herein as 
Exhibits B and C to the Appendix. Unquestionably, both certified 
and uncertified letters were sent to the address where Maureen 
Nelson resided. 
Mrs. Nelson testified that she did not hear from anybody 
with respect to any bonds regarding the Denver airport. She 
did not receive any letters from any insurance agent giving 
her notice of her husband's application for additional bond. 
(R. 199). She testified that during the 1975 period she was 
having severe domestic problems with her husband and that she 
was not in favor of him going to Denver since she believed 
this would only aggravate the situation. Her husband disagreed 
and took the Denver job anyway. (R. 201). At this time Mr. 
Nelson was not residing at the family residence but did come 
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frequently to the residence to visit his children and to 
pick up his mail. (R. 196). 
Mrs. Nelson stated that she could not recall ever 
receiving a copy of the November 19, 1975 letter. (R. 201). 
She also did not recall receiving notice in her mailbox 
concerning the certified letter which was sent to her. She 
stated that 19 75 was a bad year because of their domestic 
problems. She also stated that her husband would receive 
his mail at the residence but she did not know what he picked 
up. (R. 204). 
Subsequently, Plaintiff entered into a Settlement Agree-
ment with numerous parties including the federal government. 
There is no dispute that Mr. Nelson and his company were 
intimately involved in these negotiations and was apprised of 
all of the proposed settlement offers. (R. 123-127; 129-135; 
Exs. 13 and 14). During this period of time Mr. Nelson and 
AAA Electric was represented by James Kruetz who was a 
Denver attorney. (R. 116). 
At the time of trial both Maureen Nelson and Keith Nelson 
were represented by Salt Lake attorney John J. McCoy. The 
lower court questioned Mrs. Nelson about the dual representa-
tion and she stated that she was made aware of the advantages 
and disadvantages of having a single counsel for both parties 
but desired to go ahead with him representing both interests. 
(R. 190-191). After two days of hearing Plaintiff rested. At 
the conclusion of Plaintiff's case defense counsel moved to 
dismiss defendant Maureen Nelson on the basis that she had not 
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been properly notified of the claim asserted against her as 
an indemnitor. The lower court granted Defendant's motion 
and dismissed Mrs. Nelson from the remainder of the lawsuit. 
A copy of the argument and decision of the lower court is 
attached herein as Exhibit D. 
In July of 1985, when this matter came before the lower 
court to finalize the decision, additional statements were 
made by the court concerning the basis for dismissal of Mrs. 
Nelson. The statement of the lower court is attached herein 
as Exhibit E. The Findings and Judgment are attached as 
Exhibit F. 
This appeal is directed solely to the dismissal of 
defendant Maureen Nelson 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court improperly dismissed Maureen Nelson as 
a defendant in this lawsuit since under the terms of the 
Indemnity Agreement no notice of any claim was requir€>d to be 
given to Mrs. Nelson. However, such notice was given to her 
and was sufficient to apprise her of the claims being asserted. 
Mrs. Nelson proved no prejudice because of the alleged inadequacy 
of the notice which was sent to her. Thus, under the terms of 
the Indemnity Agreement Mrs. Nelson was personally liable for 
the losses sustained by the plaintiff. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT MAUREEN NELSON. 
The lower court dismissed the claim against Maureen 
Nelson on the basis that she had been given an inadequate 
notice as to the claims being asserted against her by the 
plaintiff and that she was not kept informed as to the 
subsequent events leading to the settlement of the various 
claims by Plaintiff. (R. 291-292) . This decision is 
incorrect based on the following: first, the terms of the 
Indemnification Agreement itself required no formal notice 
to be given to Mrs. Nelson nor did it require that she be 
made an integral part of any settlement proceedings; second, 
Mrs. Nelson was sent a notice of the problem concerning her 
husband's company and therefore even if notice was required 
it was adequately given. In addition, Mrs. Nelson was still 
married to Keith Nelson and was presumably aware of the problems 
he was having at the Stapleton Airport; third, Mrs. Nelson 
failed to show what actions she would have taken haid the 
notice been more specific or had she been involved in the 
settlement proceedings and therefore failed to show any pre-
judice which would allow dismissal of her from this suit. 
These contentions will now be addressed in. serium. 
A. The Terms of the Blanket Indemnity Agreement 
Controls and No Notice was Therefore Required 
Nor Was Participation in the Settlement 
Negotiations Required. 
It is undisputed that Mrs. Nelson executed the Blanket 
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Indemnity Agreement on September 17, 1973. At that time Mr. 
Nelson was seeking a construction contract on the Salt Lake 
City International Airport. The Federal Government would not 
allow him to work on this project without a performance bond. 
The plaintiff, which agreed to issue such bond, conditioned 
such issuance upon indemnification both from Mr. Nelson and 
Maureen Nelson. The obvious reason for requiring Mrs. Nelson 
to be a signatory to the Agreement was to prevent a transfer 
of assets between husband and wife thereby defeating the terms 
of the Indemnity Agreement. 
The terms of the Blanket Indemnity Agreement are clear 
and unambiguous. It is unnecessary to extensively analyze 
the Blanket Indemnity Agreement since the majority of its 
terms are not relevant to this appeal. The Agreement basically 
requires the indemnitors to pay for any losses sustained by 
the surety as a result of the default of the principal. The 
Indemnity Agreement is perpetual in nature in that it applies 
to all bonds or obligations underwritten by the surety, present 
and future. It provides that an indemnitor may terminate his 
or her obligation as to future bonds at any time by sending the 
proper notice to the surety. No claim has been made that 
Maureen Nelson ever exercised this provision. (Paragraph 19 of 
Agreement). 
There are several provisions throughout the Agreement 
relating to notice but specifically Paragraph 11 addressed 
the question of notice. It states: 
-8-
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The Indemnitors hereby waive notice of the 
execution of said Bond and of the acceptance of this 
Agreement, and the Principal and the Indemnitors 
hereby waive all notice of any default, or any other 
act or acts giving rise to any claim under said Bond, 
as well as notice of any and all liability of the 
Surety under said Bond, and any and all liability on 
their part hereunder, to the end and effect that, the 
Principal and the Indemnitors shall be and continue 
liable hereunder, notwithstanding any notice of any 
kind to which they might have been or be entitled, and 
notwithstanding any defenses that they might have been 
entitled to make. 
It is elementary that the nature of an indemnitor's 
liability under an indemnity agreement is determined solely 
by the provisions of the indemnity instrument. United States 
Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Napier Electric & Construction Co., 
571 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. App. 1978). It is also elementary that 
an indemnitor is liable under the terms of the agreement even 
if the indemnitor does not understand the terms or has not 
thoroughly read it. Universal Surety Co. v. Jed Construction 
Co., 265 N.W.2d 219 (Neb. 1978). Further, even if a personfs 
motive for initially becoming an indemnitor changes during 
the course of time, that person is still liable for any sub-
sequent bonding by the surety until that person has terminated 
his or her obligations under the indemnity agreement pursuant 
to its own terms. Of course, upon withdrawal by any indemnitor, 
the surety then has an opportunity to examine the risk before 
issuing additional bonds. As stated by a Florida Appellate 
Court: 
We can find no authority for the proposition 
that an individual who undertakes an obligation as 
indemnitor on behalf of a principal to whom he then 
has a business relationship, thus making the arrange-
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ment advantageous to both, should be entitled to 
terminate that obligation when the business relation-
ship has ended and the arrangement is no longer 
beneficial to the indemnitor. His motive for under-
taking the obligation may no longer exist, and 
indeed he may have every reason in the world for 
desiring to relieve himself of the obligation, but 
he nevertheless remains bound by the clear language 
of the agreement. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Buchanan, 369 
S.2d 351 (Fla. App. 1979). 
Indemnity agreements have even been held to extend beyond the 
life of the indemnitor thereby making the estate of the indemnitor 
liable for any subsequent obligation. Travelers Indemnity Co. 
v. Ducote, 380 S.2d 10 (La. 1980). 
The terms of the Blanket Indemnity Agreement are written 
for the protection of the surety. Before performance and pay-
ment bonds are issued, the principal obligor (AAA Electric 
Service in this case) and/or the indemnitors must have sufficient 
collateral to protect the surety should a demand on the bond 
be made. Construction bonds are required by law on significant 
federal, state, political subdivision and even private con-
struction projects, and sureties routinely issue many bonds to 
their principals merely upon request. The indemnity agreement, 
therefore, has been drawn so that it will continue to run 
until such time as terminated by the indemnitors or by the 
surety. It is not unusual for an indemnitor to be unsiware of 
the circumstances surrounding the business of the principal or 
even the claims that are being asserted against the principal 
unless he or she becomes directly involved in the business. 
The indemnitor has, in effect, agreed to pay back any loss 
sustained by the surety provided that the loss was paid in 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
good faith. 
In the instant situation the equities involved are even 
more apparent. Mrs. Nelson was married to Mr. Nelson and 
enjoyed the financial benefits of his construction activities 
for a number of years after execution of the Blanket Indemnity 
Agreement. She was fully aware that he was working in Colorado 
and was no doubt benefitting financially from the money he 
received from this bonded contract. 
The authorities are legion in holding under the terms 
of an indemnity agreement that unless such agreement specifi-
cally requires notice, the failure to give notice does not 
defeat the claim of the indemnitee. As stated by one legal 
authority: 
Where notice to the indemnitor is required by 
the terms of the contract, it must be given. In 
the absence of any such requirement, however, notice 
is not necessary to fix liability of the indemnitor, 
and in an action by the indemnitee against the 
indemnitor the former need not allege or prove 
notice of the act on which the obligation to indemnify 
is to arise. 41 Am. Jur.2d §40, p. 730. 
See also, 42 C.J.S. §15, p. 592. 
As stated by the First Circuit Court of Appeals: 
Unless the Indemnity Agreement so specifies, 
neither Massachusetts, nor any other court that we 
have been able to discover, requires an indemnitee 
to notify an indemnitor to come in and defend. 
Indeed, he need not even give notice of the claim. 
Boston & Main Railroad v. Bethleham Steel Co., 
311 F.2d 847, 849 (1st Cir. 1963). 
See also, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Strey, 512 F. Supp. 540 
(D. Tenn. 19 81); Crystal River Enterprises, Inc. v. Nasi, 
311 S.2d 77 (Fla. App. 1981); McStain Corp. v. Elfline 
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Plumbing & Heating, 558 P.2d 588 (Colo. App. 1976); and 
Delaware & H. R. Corp. v. Adirondack Farms Co-Op., 306 N.Y.S.2d 
1002 (Sup. Ct. 1970). 
Thus, under the specific terms of the agreement as well 
as under general indemnity law no notice whatsoever Wcis 
required to be given to defendant Maureen Nelson of the 
claims being asserted against the surety. With this principle 
in mind, it is therefore difficult to understand how the lower 
court concluded that the notice was insufficient in its wording 
to properly apprise Mrs. Nelson of the problems. 
B. Assuming Arguendo That Notice was Required 
Then the Notice Given to Maureen Nelson was 
Sufficient. 
The lower court make the following Finding of Fact: 
1. Timely notice of default was given to both 
Keith Nelson and Maureen Nelson as prescribed by the 
Agreement of Inddmnity (General) to which they were 
Indemnitors. 
2. Notice to Maureen Nelson was vague and 
insufficient and therefore did not afford reasonable 
notice to her so as to intelligently form any rational 
basis for deciding whether she should exercise her 
right under Paragraph 13 of the Agreement of Indemnity 
(General) to defend or to prosecute any particular 
claims that AAA Electric might have had against the 
United States government in order to avoid or reduce 
liability against her as an indemnitor. 
As noted above, since no notice of the default was 
required by the terms of the Agreement, any notice advising 
her of the problems should have been deemed sufficient by the 
Court. However, even viewing the notice requirement in terms 
of the court's own language, it is evident that Mrs. Nelson was 
given sufficient notice to base any future decision as to what 
-12-
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course of action to take. The notice which was sent to Mrs. 
Nelson was not only a letter addressed to her (sent by both 
regular mail and certified mail) but was also a copy of the 
letter sent to Keith Nelson. Thus, Mrs. Nelson received both 
letters from the plaintiff which certainly would have advised 
any person that a serious problem had arisen. 
In this pargicular case the principles applied to 
insurance law are applicable. Here, if any notice was required 
to be given it was by the surety to the indemnitor. This is 
not unlike an insured giving notice to their insurance company. 
In construing the sufficiency of these types of notice numerous 
courts have held that the notice is sufficient as long as the 
insurance company is given a reasonable indication of the 
claim and a chance to act. See Goodwin v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 
656 P.2d 135 (Ida. App. 1982). Courts have held that substantial 
compliance with the notice requirement is sufficient 
and that strict literal compliance is not required. Sutton v. 
Fire Ins. Exchange, 509 P.2d 418 (Ore. 1973). Courts have even 
held that when a policy requires written notice of a loss that 
oral notification is still sufficient. Fox v. National Savings 
Ins. Co., 424 P.2d 19 (Okla. 1967). 
Certainly, the combined letters sent to both Nelsons would 
have informed any reasonable person that claims were being made 
by suppliers and laborers as to the project and that there was 
a substantial question of default with the Federal government. 
Furthermore, the Denver project was the only job Maureen 
Nelson's husband had at the time and the source of their current 
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financial troubles. She was therefore certainly aware that 
the bonded project was in serious trouble. These letters 
would have caused alarm to any indemnitor who could then 
have inquired as to the specifics of the claims or other 
additional information. There is certainly no requirement 
as was imputed by the lower court that each claim must be 
itemized or that every contingency must be explained. If 
notice was in fact required then such notice was adequate in 
the present case. 
C. Even if it is Assumed Arguendo That 
Maureen Nelson Received Insufficient 
Notice She Made no Showing of Any 
Prejudice. 
The lower court made the following findings: 
Keith Nelson was kept involved and informed of 
the efforts by American Bonding Co. to resolve the 
problems and settlement of the construction and all 
related issues pertaining to the ILS and ALS contracts 
in question. Keith Nelson was also informed of the 
terms of the Take-Over Agreement and was a signatory 
thereto. Keith Nelson and his attorney, James Kruetz, 
were advised of the final settlement terms with the 
United States, and Keith Nelson had knowledge of the 
underlying facts supporting his claim for offsets. 
Mr. Nelson had reviewed such facts with his counsel, 
and he had the opportunity of settling or pursuing 
the claims independently if he saw fit. 
The record is silent as to efforts made by 
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American Bonding Co. and Farmers Home Mutual Ins. 
Co. to ascertain how to keep Maureen Nelson informed 
or to ascertain what information, if any, she was 
receiving. The record is also silent as to any 
opportunity she was given to be a party to the Take-
over Agreement. Maureen Nelson was not a party to 
the Take-Over Agreement, nor was it submitted to her 
for approval or was she advised of the terms thereof 
by American Bonding Co. 
The lower court believed that the inadequate notice did 
not allow Mrs. Nelson to participate in the settlement of 
the claims and that there was some affirmative duty on the 
part of Plaintiff to involve her. Again, this conclusion is 
erroneous. 
First, it was the obligation of Mrs. Nelson to show that 
any inadequate notice caused her prejudice. As stated by one 
authority, "Where notice of the indemnitor's liability is 
required, in order to estop the indemnitee to proceed against 
him, on account of delay in giving such notice, the indemnitor 
must show that he was prejudiced by such delay." 42 C.J.S. 
§15, p. 59 3. Just as in normal insurance cases, the mere 
failure to give notice or to give adequate notice does not 
allow an insurance carrier to escape liability unless it can 
show prejudice. It is the burden upon the receiver of the 
notice to show that such prejudice occurred. Weaver Bros., Inc. 
v. Chappel, 684 P.2d 123 (Ala. 1984); Hallsey v. Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 168 (Ore. App. 1984); and Thompson v. 
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Grange Ins. Assn., 660 P.2d 307 (Wash. App. 1983). 
In the instant case Maureen Nelson did not attempt to 
show any prejudice nor could she have done so. There were 
no default judgments entered against AAA Electric. At all 
times AAA and Maureen's husband were represented by legal 
counsel. Mr. Nelson was involved in each aspect of the 
completion of the project and was involved in all of the 
negotiations with the exception of signing the Settlement 
Agreement, which agreement he apparently refused to sign 
unless released from indemnity. Since Mr. Nelson was 
intimately familiar with each claim being asserted, his 
presence in the negotiations and settlement protected Mrs. 
Nelson's interests. Even so, however, the court gave judgment 
against him, thereby indicating his responsibility in the 
contract agreements. 
There is nothing in the Indemnity Agreement which requires 
the plaintiff to consult with each indemnitor as to any settle-
ment claim. Such a result would be absurd in cases such as 
this in which literally hundreds of claims were being asserted 
and in which the indemnitor would have absolutely no knowledge 
as to the validity of any claim. Since indemnitors can be 
relatives, friends, banking institutions, etc. there is clearly 
reason in not requiring their involvement in the settlement of 
claims. 
The court's comparison to Mr. Nelson's involvement was 
inappropriate since Mr. Nelson's personal company was the 
principal obligor as well as the indemnitor. His participation 
- i f i -
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in the settlement agreements was critical to obtaining a 
fair and just payout because of his personal knowledge of 
factual matters. Since Mr. Nelson would not consent to the 
final settlement agreement with the Government, AAA's claims 
were reserved and therefore still could have been pursued if 
it had chosen to do so. There was no duty of the surety to 
pursue AAA's claim in any event. 
The identical interests of Keith and Maureen Nelson 
were further illustrated by the fact that both utilized the 
same attorney during the trial. The presence or absence of 
Maureen Nelson in the negotiation procedures would have had 
no effect whatsoever upon the disposition of the claims or 
in the ultimate outcome of this case, and she has not claimed 
otherwise. 
In summary, therefore, even if it is assumed that the 
notice received by her in the two November letters was insuffi-
cient, Mrs. Nelson made no showing that she would have done 
anything differently had more specific information been 
received. Neither did Mrs. Nelson show that she would have 
done anything differently had she been involved in the settle-
ment conferences or in the formulation of the Take-Over Agreement. 
It is clear that the Indemnification Agreement never contemplated 
such involvement of an indemnitor. 
CONCLUSION 
The Indemnification Agreement executed by Maureen Nelson 
was done so freely and willingly for the purpose of assisting 
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her husband to obtain the desired contract work in the 
expectation of pecuniary benefit. Two federal airport 
contracts were awarded to AAA Electric that otherwise 
would have been lost. The terms of the Agreement are clear 
and unambiguous. No notice of default is legally required. 
Nevertheless, the plaintiff notified both Mr. Nelson and 
Mrs. Nelson in a manner reasonably calculated to cause 
interested persons to investigate further if they felt the 
need to do so. In fact, Mr. Nelson was acutely aware of the 
financial pressures and Maureen relied upon him to protect 
her interests as he could. The lower court's finding to 
the contrary was clearly erroneous. 
Even if it is assumed that the notice was inadequate/ 
Mrs. Nelson made no showing that she suffered prejudice 
because of this notice. The requirement of the lower court 
that an indemnitor actively participate in all of the settlement 
and negotiating procedures was also clearly contrary to the 
intent and language of the Indemnification Agreement and is 
contrary to the law. Such a requirement would eliminate the 
agreed standard of good faith payment utilized in these types 
of cases since each indemnitor would always have to be a party 
to all claim settlement procedures in order for a surety to 
protect itself from after-the-fact criticism by indemnitors. 
Mrs. Nelson was represented by the same attorney as 
her husband throughout the remainder of the trial in this case. 
She suffered no prejudice. The judgment of the lower court 
should be reversed, Maureen Nelson should be reinstated as 
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a defendant, and as an indemnitor be subject to the present 
judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
wr v 
&£30etiftis ^Norton 
Attorneys for P l a in t i f f 
fj/^rfX-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant were mailed postage prepaid to John L. 
McCoy, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 310 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 this %'XJ^ day of September, 1986. 
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NLXY AQ^EEMENT 
'a7iri / . U t f J J LsteLptember 
JftHlS 2 soPHf?fc 
u *' r 
: and entered mto this j
 w 
by (!n*r« full n.me «nd «idrew of Principal) K e i t h R. N e 1 s on
 r d b a AAA ELECTRICAL SERVTCF. 
4 3 6 2 
day of 
SECRETARY OF SWE 
CTATF OF COLORE 7 3 
(hereinafter called the Principal) and 
(Intcrc full namei and addresses of Indemnitor*, if a n y ) . 
K e i t h R. N e l s o n 
M a u r e e n N e l s o n 
and AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY, 8601 Beverly Blvd., Los 
WITNESSE' 
al, in the transaction of business, 
Atr \^jrfftUict of litigation, whether in 
ytcipal or participating silentl 
ive or procure certain 
f :other obligations, 
sions, renewals, 
Principal ani 
ncipal ai 
to be exec! 
a substantial 
Sonds. 
deration of the premises and the 
eceipt whereof is acknowledged, the PrincTpaJ an* 
and assigns, jointly and severally, hereby covenamvai 
d the Indemnitors, if any) 
called the Surety},, 
lfillmer.t of 
dventurer 
ure desire 
nary guaran-
all of which 
ore or hereafter 
cancelling said 
Express unde>s$an'<HBfg that this Agreement 
fter executeyDr procure to be executed 
ibtailing of the Bonds or in the 
*£S7 
($1.00) in hand paid by the Surety 
for themselves, their heirs, exec-
ith the Surety, its successors and 
to the Princii ^ 
utors, administrate? 
assigns, as follows: 
PREMIUMS 
FIRST: The Principal and the Indemnitors will pay to the Surety in such manner as may be agreed upon all premiums 
and charges of the Surety for the Bonds in accordance with its rate filings, its manual of rates, or as otherwise agreed upon, until 
the Principal or Indemnitors shall serve evidence satisfactory to the Surety of its discharge or release from the Bonds and all liability 
by reason thereof. 
INDEMNITY 
SECOND: The Principal and Indemnitors shall exonerate, indemnify, and keep indemnified the Surety from and against 
my and all liability for losses and/or expenses of whatsoever kind or nature (including, but rot limited to, interest, court costs and 
counsel fees) and from and against any and all such losses and/or expenses which the Surety mav sustain and incur: (1) By reason 
of having executed or procured the execution of the Bonds, (2) By reason of the failure of the Principal or Indemnitors to perform 
or comply with the covenants and conditions of this Agreement or (3) In enforcing anv of the covenants and conditions of this 
Agreement. Payment by reason of the aforesaid causes shall be made immediately to the Surety by the Principal and Indemnitors 
as soon as liability exists or is asserted against the Surety, whether or not the Surety shall have made any payment therefor. In the 
event the Surety shall not have made payment therefor, the Principal and the Indemnitors shall place the Surety in current funds 
in an amount or amounts demanded by the Surety in its discretion as necessary to meet such existing or asserted liability, and the 
Surety shall hold such funds as collateral security, in addition to the indemnity afforded by this Agreement, with the right to 
use such funds or anv part thereof, at any time, in payment or compromise of such existing or asserted liability. In the event of 
any payment by the Surety, the Principal and Indemnitors further agree that in any accounting between the Surety and the Principal, 
or between the Surety and the Indemnitors, or either or both of them, the Surety shall be entitled to charge for any and all dis-
/
 bursements made by it in good faith in and about the matters herein contemplated by this Agreement under the belief that it is or 
was liable for the sum or sums so disbursed, or that it was necessary or expedient to make such disbursements, whether or not such 
liability, necessity or expediency existed; and that the vouchers or other evidence of any such payments made by the Surety shall 
be prima facie evidence of the fact and amount of the liability to the Surety. 
ASSIGNMENT 
THIRD: The Principal and Indemnitors will assign, transfer and set over, and do hereby assign, transfer and set over, to 
the Surety, as collateral, to secure the obligations of any and all paragraphs of this Agreement and any other indebtedness and liabili-
ties of the Principal to the Surety, whether heretofore or hereafter incurred, the assignment in the case of each contract to become 
effective as of the date of the bond covering such contract, but only in the event of (1) any assertion by the obligee(s) in said Bonds 
of any breach or default in any of said Bonds, or the Principal has abandoned the work on or forfeited any contract OT contracts 
covered by any of said Bonds, or has failed to pay obligations incurred in connection therewith; or (2) of any claim or demand 
upon the Surety, the Principal or obligee (s) in the Bonds by reason of the non-payment of any laborer, materialman or subcon-
tractor or the supplier of other services rendered in the performance of any said contracts; or (3) of any breach of the provisions 
of any of the paragraphs of this Agreement; or (4) of a default in discharging such other indebtedness or liabilities when due; 
or (5) of any assignment by the Principal for the benefit of creditors, or of the appointment, or of any application for the arvpoint-
' mem, of a receiver or trustee for the Principal whether insolvent or not; or (6) of any proceeding which deprives the Principal 
of the u*e of any of the machinery, equipment, plant, tools or material referred to in section (b) of this paragraph; or (7) of the 
Principal's dy'mf:, absconding, disappearing, incompetency, being convicted of a felony or imprisoned, ii the Principal be an indi-
vidual or individuzh: (a) All rights of the Principal and Indemnitors, or of any of them, in, and growing in any manner out of, 
m/M contracts referred to in the Bonds, or in, or growing in any manner out of the Bonds; (b) All the rights, title and interest of 
Efee Principal and Indemnitors; or of any of them, in and to all machinery, equipment, plant, tools and material which are now, or 
K a y hereafter be, shout or upon the site or sires of any and all contractual work referred to in the Bonds or elsewhere, including 
T materia It purchased ior or chargeable to any and all contracts referred to in the bonds, materials which may be in process of con-
^ ttruction, in storage elsewhere, or in transportation to any and all of said sites; (c) All the rights, title and interest of the Prin-
cipal and Indemnitors, or of any of them, in and to all subcontracts let or to be let in connection with any and all contracts 
nkrrtd to in the Bonds, and in and to all surety bonds supporting such subcontracts; (d) All actions, causes of actions, claims and 
demands whatsoever which the Principal and Indemnitors or any of them, may have or acquire against any subcontractor, laborer 
or materialman, or any person, firm or corporation furnishing or agreeing to furnish or supply labor, material, supplies, machinery, 
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IUUIS vr vuizi equipment in connection with or on account of any and all contracts referred to in the Bonds; and against anv surety 
or sureties of any subcontractor, laborer or materialman; (e) Any and all percentages retained and any and all sums that may be 
due or hereafter become due on account of any and all contracts referred to in the Bonds and all other contracts whether bonded or 
not in which the Principal has an interest; (f) All actions, causes of actions, claims and demands for damage to the work performed 
by or on behalf of the Principal under any contract referred to in the Bonds and caused by any act or omission of any persons, firm. 
corporation or other legal entity, whether public or private. 
T R U S T F U N D 
F O U R T H : If any of the Bonds are executed in connection with a contract which by its terms or by law prohibits the assign-
ment of the contract price, or any part thereof, the Principal and Indemnitors covenant and agree that all payments received for 
or on account of said contract shall be held as a trust fund in which the Surety has an interest, for the payment of obligations incurred 
in the performance of the contract and for labor, materials, and services furnished in the prosecution of the work provided in said 
contract or any authorized extension or modication thereof; and, further, it is expressly understood and declared that all monies 
due and to become due under any contract or contracts covered by the Bonds arc trust funds, whether in the possession of the Prin-
cipal or Indemnitors or otherwise, for the benefit of and for payment of all such obligations in connection with any such contract 
or contracts for which the Surety would be liable under any of said Bonds, and this Agreement and declafation shall also con-
stitute notice of such trust. 
U N I F O R M C O M M E R C I A L C O D E 
F I F T H : This Agreement shall constitute a Security Agreement to the Surety and also a Financing Statement, both in 
accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code of every jurisdiction wherein such Code is in effect and may be so 
used by the Surety without in any way abrogating, restricting or limiting the rights of the Surety under this Agreement or under 
law, or in equity. 
TAKEOVER 
S I X T H : In the event of any breach or default asserted by the obligee in any said Bonds, or the Principal has abandoned 
the work on or forfeited any contract or contracts covered by any said Bonds, or has failed to pay obligations incurred in connec-
tion therewith, or in the event of the death, disappearance, Principal's conviction for a felony, imprisonment, incompetency, in-
solvency, or bankruptcy of the Principal, or the appointment of a receiver or trustee for the Principal, or the property of the Prin-
cipal, or in the event of an assignment for the benefit of creditors of the Principal, or ii any action is taken by or against the 
Principal under or by virtue of the National Bankruptcy Act, or should reorganization or arrangement proceedings be filed by or 
against the Principal under said Act, or U any action is taken by or against the Principal under the insolvency or bankruptcy law? 
of any Country, State, Possession, or Territory, foreign or domestic, the Surety shall have the right, at its option and in its sole 
discretion and is hereby authorized, with or without exercising any other right or option conferred upon it by law or in the term* 
of this Agreement, to take possession of any part or all of the work under any contract or contracts covered by any said Bonds, and 
at the expense of the Principal and Indemnitors to complete or arrange for the completion of the same, and the Principal and 
Indemnitors shall promptly upon demand pay to the Surety all lossses, and expenses so incurred. 
CHANGES 
S E V E N T H : The Surety is authorized and empowered, without notice to or knowledge of the Indemnitors to assent to 
any change whatsoever in the Bonds, and/or any contract referred to in the Bonds, and/or in the general conditions, plans and/or 
specifications accompanying said contracts, including, but not limited to, any change in the time for the completion of said contracts 
and to payments or advances thereunder before the same may be due, and to assent to or take any assignment or assignments, to 
execute or consent to the execution of any continuations, extensions, or renewals of the Bonds and to execute any substitute or 
substitutes therefor, with the same or different conditions, provisions and obligees and with the same or larger or smaller penalties, 
it being expressly understood and agreed that the Indemnitors shall remain bound under the terms of this Agreement even though 
any such assent by the Surety does or might substantially increase the liability of said Indemnitors. 
ADVANCES 
E I G H T H : The Surety is authorized and empowered to guarantee loans, to advance or lend to the Principal a/iy money, 
which the Surety may see fit, for the purpose of any contracts referred to in, or guaranteed by the Bonds; and all money expended 
in the completion of any such contracts by the Surety or lent or advanced from time to time to the Principal, or guaranteed by the 
Surety for the purpose of any such contracts, and all costs, and expenses incurred by the Surety in relation thereto, unless repaid 
with legal interest by the Principal to the Surety when due, shall be presumed to be a loss by the Surety for which the Principal and 
the Indemnitors shall be responsible, notwithstanding that said money or any part thereof should not be so used by the Principal. 
BOOKS A N D RECORDS 
N I N T H : At any time, and until such time as the liability of the Surety under any and all said Bonds is terminated, the 
Surety shall have the right to reasonable access to the books, records, and accounts of the Principal and Indemnitors; and any 
bank depository, materialman, supply house, or other person, firm, or corporation when requested by the Surety is hereby authorized 
to furnish the Surety any information requested including, but not limited to, the status of the work under contracts being per-
formed by the Principal, the condition of the performance of such contracts and payments of accounts. 
D E C L I N E E X E C U T I O N 
T E N T H : Unless otherwise specifically agreed in writing, the Surety may decline to execute any Bond and the Principal 
and Indemnitors agree to make no claim to the contrary in consideration of the Surety's receiving this Agreement; and ii the Surety 
shall execute a Bid or Proposal Bond, it shall have the right to decline to execute any and all of the bonds that may be required 
in connection with any award that may be made under the proposal for which the Bid or Proposal Bond is given and such declination 
shall not diminish or alter the liability that may arise by reason of having executed the Bid or Proposal Bond. 
N O T I C E O F E X E C U T I O N 
E L E V E N T H : The Indemnitors hereby waive notice of the execution of said Bonds and of the acceptance of this Agree-
ment, and the Principal and the Indemnitors hereby waive all notice of any default, or any other act or acts giving rise to any claim 
under said Bonds, as well as notice of any and all liability of the Surety under said Bonds, and any and all liability on their part here-
under, to the end and effect that, the Principal and the Indemnitors shall be and continue liable hereunder, notwithstanding any notice 
of any kind to which they might have been or be entitled, and notwithstanding any defenses they might have been entitled to make. 
E X E M P T I O N WAIVER 
T W E L F T H : The Principal and the Indemnitors hereby waive, so far as their respective obligations under this Agreement 
are concerned, all rights to claim any of their property, including their respective homesteads, as exempt from levy, execution, sale or 
other legal process under the laws of any Country, State, Territory or Possession, foreign or domestic. 
S E T T L E M E N T S 
T H I R T E E N T H : The Surety shall have the right to adjust, settle or compromise any claim, demand, suit or:judgment 
upon the Bonds unless the Principal and the Indemnitors shall request the Surety to litigate such claim or demand, or to defend 
such suit, or to appeal from such judgment, and shall deposit with the Surety, at the time of such request, cash or collateral satis-
factory to the Surety in kind and amount, to be used in paying any judgment or judgments rendered or that may be rendered, 
with Tnteresf; costs, expenses and attorneys' fees, including those of the Surety. 
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f U L M L L A i r l ; In the event the Surety procures the execution of the Bonds by other sureties, or executes the Bonds 
with co-sureties, or reinsures any portion of said Bonds with reinsuring sureties, then all the terms and conditions of this Agree-
ment shall inure to the benefit of such other sureties, co-sureties and reinsuring sureties, as their interests may appear. 
SUITS 
FIFTEENTH: Separate suits may be brought hereunder as causes of action accrue, and the bringing of suit or the recovery 
of judgment upon any cause of action shall not prejudice or bar the bringing of other suits upon other causes of action, whether 
theretofore or thereafter arising. 
OTHER INDEMNITY 
SIXTEENTH: That the Principal and the Indemnitors shall continue to remain bound under the terms of this Agreement 
even though the Surety may have from time to time heretofore or hereafter, with or without notice to or knowledge of the Prin-
cipal and the Indemnitors, accepted or released other agreements of indemnity or collateral in connection with the execution or 
procurement of said Bonds, from the Principal or Indemnitors or others, it being expressly understood and agreed by Principal 
and the Indemnitors that any and all other rights which the Surety may have or acquire against the Principal and the Indemniton 
and/or others under any such other or additional agreements of indemnity or collateral shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, 
the rights afforded the Surety under this Agreement. 
INVALIDITY 
SEVENTEENTH: In case any of the parties mentioned in this Agreement fail to execute the same, or in case the execu-
tion hereof by any of the parties be defective or invalid for any reason, such failure, defect or invalidity shall not in any manner 
affect the validity of this Agreement or the liability hereunder of any of the parties executing the same, but each and every party so 
executing shall be and remain fully bound and liable hereunder to the same extent as if such failure, defect or invalidity had not 
existed. It is understood and agreed by the Principal and Indemnitors that the rights, powers, and remedies given the Surety under 
this Agreement shall be and are in addition to and not in lieu of, any and all other rights, powers, and remedies which the Surety 
may have or acquire against the Principal and Indemnitors or others whether by the terms of any other agreement or by operation 
of law or otherwise. 
ATTORNEY IN FACT 
EIGHTEENTH: The Principal and the Indemnitors hereby irrevocably nominate, constitute, appoint and designate the 
Surety, or any nominee(s) of the Surety, as their attorney-in-fact with the right, but not the obligation, to exercise all the rights of 
the Principal and Indemnitors, or of any of them, assigned, transferred and set over to the Surety in this Agreement, and in the 
name of the Principal and the Indemnitors, or in the name(s) of any of them, to make, execute and deliver any and all additional 
or other assignments, documents or papers, and likewise to endorse, negotiate, transfer, collect or deposit any negotiable instrument 
or the proceeds thereof received by the Surety, or its nominee(s) under any such rights assigned to it, each and all when deemed 
necessary by the Surety, or its nominee(s) to give full effect not only to the intent and meaning of the within assignments, but also 
to the full protection intended to be herein given to the Surety under all of the provisions of this Agreement. The Principal and 
the Indemnitors hereby ratify and confirm all acts and actions taken and done by the Surety, or by its nominee(s), as such 
attorney-in-fact. 
TERMINATION 
NINETEENTH: This Agreement may be terminated as to the Principal or as to any Indemnitor upon twenty days' 
written notice sent by the Principal or by any such Indemnitor by registered mail to the Surety at its home office at Los Angeles, 
California 90048. but any such notice of termination shall not operate to modify, bar or discharge the Principal or any such 
Indemnitor as to the Bonds that may have been theretofore executed. Provided also, that any such termination shall not act to 
terminate this Agreement as to any party who has not given the aforesaid notice to the Surety, and any such party shall continue 
to remain bound under this Agreement and hereby o pressly waives any notice of termination by any other party hereunder. 
TWENTIETH: This Agreement may not be changed or modified orally. No change or modification shall be effective 
jnless made by written endorsement executed to form a part hereof. 
TWENTY-FIRST:. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed and sealed the day and year first above written. 
1TTEST OR WITNESS: 
K e i t h R. N e l s o n , d b a 
AAA-, ELECTRICAL SERVICE (SEAL) 
~ cf(^ /f^l) C O <^7 
t e i t h R# Ne l son 
'h^^^KXTSk^ 
JTST\ 
hZfr 
(SEAL) 
(SEAL) 
(SEAL) 
_. . .
 % . f 7 \ „ (SEAL) 
, >Keith R. Nelson, Individually 
C (SEAL) 
.(SEAL) 
.(SEAL) 
.(SEAL) 
AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY 
By .-« & „*«</ 1/ > 4 £ (SEAL) 
Attorney-in-Fact 
iportant: Forms of Acknowledgment will be found on the reverse side. 
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For Acknowledgment of Principal's Signature 
INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATE OF UTAH % 
COUNTY OF S A L T LAKE J*s.: 
On this — l l l h day of S e p t e m b e r , in the year 1 9 7 3 , before me personally come (s) 
K e i t h & M a u r e e n N e l s o n 
to me known and known to me to he the person(s) who (is) (a^e) described in and whojixecuted^.e foregoing instrument r  e  
and acknowledge (s) to me that the}! executed the sar/e. 
{p??/?! ( ,Jt*ri fa r<4-,-. -. 
(Signature and tWe-tSHifficiil taking acknowledgment) 
PARTNERSHIP ACKNOWLEDGMENT J e 3 n M < L a m b o u " e * " * - " 
STATE OF ^ 
C O U N T Y OF j* s s . : 
On this .. day of — , in the year 19 , before me personally comes 
a member of the co-partnership of 
to me known and known to me to be the person who is described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and 
acknowledges to me that he executed the same as and for the act and deed of the said co-partnership. 
(Signature and title of official taking acknowledgment) 
CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATE OF _ 
C O U N T Y OF . ;}-
On this day of , in the year 19 , before me personally comes 
to me known, who, being by me duly sworn, deposes and says that he resides in the City of 
that he is the of the ; 
the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument; that he knows the seal of the said corporation; 
that the seal affixed to the said instrument is such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by the order of the Board of Directors 
of said corporation, and that he signed his name thereto by like order. 
(Signature and title of official taking acknowledgment) 
For Acknowledgment of Indemnitors9 Signatures 
INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATE OF U T A H 
COUNTY OF S A L T LAKE : } • • 
On this 1 7 t h day of S e p t e m b e r
 % j n t n c year 19 7 4 , before me personally come(s) 
Keith & Maureen Nelson 
to me known and known to me to be the person ( s ) vfiurjbfcjart^ ^flsjggfl^&£?** who executed the foregoing instrument 
and acknowledge (s) tome that LheY executed the same. A \ ^__3f' / 
' 06~J?9-t <f-m6*t«Uc£. 
/(Signature and title ©fjofficial taking acknowledgment 
/ . - J e a n M. L a m b o u r n e 4 - 4 - 7 5 
INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF . :} 
On this day of ., in the year 19 , before me personally come(s) 
to me known and known to me to be the person (s) who (is) (are) described in and who executed the foregoing instrument 
and acknowledge (s) to me that he executed the same. 
(Signature and title of official taking acknowledgment) 
PARTNERSHIP ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATE OF 
C O U N T Y OF . :}-On this day of , in the year 19 , before me personally comes 
a member of the co-partnership of — — — — • ; 
to me known and known to me to be the person who is described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and 
acknowledges to me that he executed the same as and for the act and deed of the said co-partnership. 
(Signature and title of official taking acknowledgment) 
CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATE OF . 
COUNTY OF . ;}„, 
On this day of _ , in the year 19 , before me personally comes 
to me known, who, being by me duly sworn, deposes and says that he resides in the City of 
that he is the . of the 
the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument; that he knows the seal of the said corporation; 
that the seal affixed t» the said instrument is such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by the order of the Board of Directors 
of said corporation, and that he signed his name thereto by like order. 
(Signature and title of official taking acknowledgment) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
REQUESTED - Cert. No. 7t>s:><u 
(Copy also sent by Regular Kail) 
American Bonding Company 
*Ztntclnt ijVei'vaiKa 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES - 1 6 0 1 BEVERLY BOULEVARD 
LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA ? 0 M ! 
TELEPHONE (213) 655 8007 
November 19, 1975 
Mr. Keith R. Nelson 
AAA Electripdl Service 
4362 Soujtfi515 East 
Salt I^ tTe City, Utah 84107 
Re: Contract Bond Nos. 20136 & 20137 
Obligee: Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Dear Mr. Nelson: 
Your files will reflect that American Bonding Company is your surety on the above 
two bonds covering projects at Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado. 
Claims from unpaid materialmen and subcontractors have been filed against American 
Bonding Company and the above bonds. In addition, American Bonding Company has 
been sued by unpaid claimants. 
As an inducement for American Bonding Company to execute bonds on your behalf, 
you signed a Blanket Indemnity Agreement (copy attached) wherein you agreed, 
among other things, to hold American Bonding Company harmless from any loss, costi 
etc. that it might sustain due to its executing bonds on your behalf. Our counsel 
in Denver, Dean R. Vanatta, Esq., is representing American Bonding Company in thei 
claim matters and we request your full cooperation with him and with American 
Bonding Company in endeavoring to resolve the problems of completion and unpaid 
claimants. Mr. Vanattafs address and telephone number is noted below. 
We are sending this letter to you for the purpose of placing you on notice of 
these existing problems and to further advise you that American Bonding Company 
expects you to abide by your obligations under the Blanket Indemnity Agreement. 
Very truly yours, 
AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY 
WBG:pm 
cc: Mr8. Maureen Nelson 
f^ Sfean R. Vanatta, Esq. 
Wagner, Wyers and Vanatta 
921-927 Equitable Building 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
W. B. Gillingham 
Vice President 
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u,.vxirxui; - *V.&.AUR1S RECEIPT 
REQUESTED - Cert. No. 768542 
(Copy also sent by Regular Hail) 
American Bonding Company 
^Lincoln, ^Aelnzma 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES - 8601 BEVERLY BOULEVARD 
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90048 
TELEPHONE (213) 6 5 5 8 0 0 7 
November 19, 1975 
84107 
Re: AAA Electrical Service 
Contract Bond Nos. 20136 & 20137 
Obligee: Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Dear Mrs. Nelson: 
American Bonding Company is the surety for AAA Electrical Service in 
connection with the above two bonds. As an inducement for American Bonding 
Company to execute bonds on behalf of AAA Electrical Service, you signed a 
Blanket Indemnity Agreement dated September 17, 1973, wherein, among other 
things, you agreed to hold American Bonding Company harmless from any loss, 
costs, etc. that it might sustain due to its executing bonds on behalf of 
AAA Electrical Service. 
The purposecf this letter is to put you on notice that claims and suits 
have been filed against American Bonding Company and its bonds noted above. 
Further, American Bonding Company expects you to abide by the terms and 
conditions of the Blanket Indemnity Agreement. 
Very truly yours, 
AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY 
W. B. Gillingham 
Vice President 
WBG:pm 
c c : Mr. Keith R. Nelson 
l^ffean R. Vanatta, Esq. 
E x h i b i t C 
Mrs. Maureen/Nelson 
4362 Soutj/615 East 
Sa l t L^k^City, Utah 
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MR. NORTON: Can Counsel give me the divorce 
number? 
MR. McCOY: I don't have it right here. I 
handle the divorce, thank God, but I believe we can find it. 
I have a motion to dismiss to make. I don't know that now 
would be an appropriate time to make it, or if we should 
defer it until later, 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. McCOY: With respect to Maureen Nelson, 
I would move to dismiss on the basis that there is no proof 
that notice of any of the proceedings the bonding company 
.y 
took in this particular case — no notice was given to 
Mrs. Nelson. We have a situation here where she signs 
a document at her home in 1973 and then some six or seven 
years down line gets a letter from the bonding company demanding 
some $87,000, a rather insidious thing, to say the least. 
She did sign an agreement, but there are provisions which 
I donft think should be enforced. 
In terms of notice, it's quite apparent to 
me, from the testimony of the witnesses, that by the time 
this bond loss occurred that the bonding company was looking 
solely to Mr. Nelson, and they did not — they took no steps 
whatsoever to talk to Mrs. Nelson. 
And under those circumstances what did they 
do? They went ahead and, number one, executed a takeover 
document, which was in effect an assignment of the agreement, 
of the extras, all of the contract rights, all of the 
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receivables cf Triple A Electric Company to the bending 
companies. And that of course was done — the record is 
totally devoid of any notice whatever, written notice or 
versa! notice for that matter, given to the defendant, 
Maureen Nelson. 
At that point it's quite apparent that nobody 
had control except for the bonding company, because they 
held the pursestrings and had basically all of the rights 
in that particular situation• The original indemnification 
agreement contemplates that, before that takes place, that 
an assignment be made of the contract rights in all the 
contracts to the surety. There is no provision in there 
that says that notice shall be given% to the indemnitors. 
But there is also, the way I read that document, no provision 
that says that notice should not be given to the indemnitors 
in the event of such an assignment. 
Then going further, what occurred? I think 
that, in effect, was a disposition of collateral under both 
the Colorado Commercial Code and the Utah Commercial Code. 
I have checked them and their provisions are both the same 
with respect to disposition of collateral on secured interestfe 
in collateral. And I think the case law is the same 
basically in Colorado and in Utah. And that is that written 
notice of the disposition of the collateral must be given 
to the debtor, and it's quite obvious here at the bonding 
company, considering that Mrs. Nelson is a debtor, and since 
they do that, then they are required under the code to give 
her notice. I 
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The contract itself, the original indemnification 
agreement provides that it shall act cr he a security 
instrument under the laws of any state where the principal I 
«r[^oc business. And in this ""articularcase itfs rirht ci 
the face of the indemnity agreement, Exhibit P-l, that was 
filed in the state of Colorado with the Secretary of State's 
Office, thus making it a security interest. 
It's quite apparent from the conduct of the 
parties that this was in fact a security interest, and the 
subsequent assignment was a disposition of that security 
interest in the contract rights and a severing of Triple A 
Electric from the United States Government. 
Then going further than that, down the line 
you have, at the end of the road, the settlement which was 
in fact made in that particular case. And here again, no 
notice given to Maureen Nelson, no attempt to notify her. 
And there certainly is an abundance of attempts to advise 
Mr. Nelson of the situation, but nothing said to Mrs. Nelson. 
I think it's quite apparent that at that time the bonding 
company was looking solely to Mr. Nelson. They were not 
looking to Mrs. Nelson. 
And under the case law that's in existence 
in this state with respect — I'll get the cases, your Honor. 
I didn't know whether we would end today, or I would have 
anticipated giving them to you. But I can get them for 
you. 
The particular case here in Utah involved the 
sale of a mobile home and the proceedings after the sale 
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of that mobile home by the secured party to enforce a ! 
deficiency. And the Utah court in that case held thai: because 
the secured parry had not. given written notice as required I 
V v -»/* ,J c J- V,
 = X. X. U ^. » - ^ , ^ , . 1 ^ *. ,» X. ^ — XT^.^.^.;-. J-"»-^ J ^ X T - ' ^ i ^ ^ ^ , . i 
Likewise, there are some Colorado cases that 
say the same thing. But here what we are trying to do is 
that they are saying, "Well, we took this collateral, the 
claims against the government that were extras, the balance 
of the contract,and we then essentially compromised that 
claim. You might say we sold it, or whatever we did with 
it, but we essentially realized what money we could out 
of it, and now we want you, Mrs. Nelson, to pay the remainder} 
And they cannot do that without giving written 
notice to the debtor. And I think under their own agreement, 
the assignment, certainly after this long a time, some I J 
think three years or four years, even under their own I 
agreement they would have been required to give her notice. 
I would grant that the contract, the indemnity 
agreement sued upon here doesn't make it incumbent upon J 
the company to give her written notice, but there have been 
a number of cases in this state involving essentially 
forfeitures and this sort of thing that primarily involve 
uniform real estate contracts where they are talking about 
a forfeiture and that the interest will be forfeited and 
it doesn'tsay anything about one notice or two notices, J 
but yet our Supreme Court has required that notice be given 
of impending deficiencies, or shall we say defaults in I 
contracts rather than to allow a party to sit back and be 
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silent: and then come in to a party and hand them a bill 
for some $87,000 plus attorneys fees and expect it to be 
paid after six or seven years. Sc to me the action by the 
bonding company against Mrs. Nelson should be dismissed. 
THE COURT: Mr. Norton? 
MR. NORTON: Taken in order as argued, first, 
no notice of claim, at least three times there the indemnity 
agreement itself does have a proceeding as to notice. It 
is paragraph 11 and it states: "Indemnitors hereby waive 
all notice of any default or any other act or acts giving 
rise to any claim under said bond, as well as notice of 
any and all liability of the surety under said bond and 
any and all liability on their part hereunder to the end 
and the effect that the principal and indemnitors shall 
be and continue liable hereunder notwithstanding any notice 
of any kind to which they might have or be entitled and 
notwithstanding any defenses they might have been entitled 
to make." 
So if a provision can cover it, it has covered 
it. As to notice, secondly, the evidence is that notice 
was given first by certified mail to her residence and return 
unclaimed, giving her ample opportunity to get the notice 
by certified mail. 
Secondly, two other identical letters sent 
by regular mail, one informing her of her liability and 
the second one a copy of the letter to Mr. Nelson, informing 
him of his liability. Both of these letters were sent by 
regular mail, addressed to Maureen Nelson. 
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And her testimony that she was under great 
emotional stress during that period of time and she simply 
doesn't know what she got, that she may have received them 
the 1976 deposition, taken in the divorce case, that there 
was some mention of the bond. 
The second contention is that if there's no 
notice, then there's no claim for a deficiency. It's hard 
to keep current with the law and there is a case handed 
down in Utah filed December 29, 198 0, the Utah Bank & Trust 
v. Quinn case. It's not yet in the Reporters, I believe. 
And the number is 1628(a). That case talks about the issue 
that Counsel has raised as to whether or not a deficiency 
can be received under the UCC if no notice was given. 
This case recognizes the apparent split between states, 
some allowing the deficiency, some not, and decided that 
in Utah a deficiency is awardable, and the test is that 
the acts were commercially reasonable in disposing of the 
collateral. 
We think that in the first instance it's not 
applicable, because our only obligation is to dispose of 
it. If the UCC does apply, then the test is to be 
commercially reasonable. 
I believe there was a third contention, and 
that is that the effect of taking the assignment somehow 
released Mrs. Nelson of her obligations under the indemnity 
agreement. Paragraph 16 of that agreement provides in 
part: "It being expressly understood and agreed by 
204 
O #v^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
principal and indemnitors that any and all other rights 
which the surety may have cr acquire against the principal 
and the indemnitors cr ethers under any such other or 
^ ^ ^ ^ x . , ^ ^ - 1 ~„^.~ -,-.. g.^j-- ^ x: --^-3 -^^,- --J r*— *--"»•» ^J-c^.= 1 ~T i "i U ^ 
— Z ~ — " J. w ' ' — C-.*-*-.— —w 
in addition to and not in lieu of the rights afforded to 
surety under this agreement." 
In other words, the basic document between 
the surety and the principal and the indemnitors is not 
one of insurance, but it is one of surety, meaning that 
the principal obligors and the indemnitors must first answer, 
and the surety, if it be called upon to answer, is entitled 
to reimbursement as per the agreement between the parties. 
MR. McCOY: Your Honor, I would just,like to 
make this point. Well, two points. 
I didn't say that the assignment essentially 
forfeited any rights that the bonding company had under 
the indemnity agreement:. I said that there was essentially 
a disposition of the rights that those parties had in the 
contract right, the principal had against the government. 
And if that wasn't a disposition, certainly the settlement 
that was subsequently followed was. Neither of which showed 
notice of — I'm certainly interested in the Utah Bank v. 
Quinn case and what kind of collateral they were dealing 
with. I doubt they were dealing with some $200,000 in contract 
rights that has really no known value, or no determinable 
value in terms of what is commercially reasonable. I'll 
get that case. 
But going further, the only notice that has 
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even been offered before the Court is to me a rather 
innocuous letter indicating that a default has occurred 
on the contract — I think that's Exhibit P-7, your Honor --
and that they are looking to her for some action under their 
indemnity agreement which she signed many years ago. 
Basically all that is is about the equivalent 
of, let's say I'm making payments on an automobile and the 
company sends me a notice and tells me that I'm behind in 
my payments. Now, that is not notice of disposition as 
required by the code. The code requires that notice of 
actual disposition be given, and that letter didn't mention 
anything about the deposition of the claims of Triple A 
against the bonding company. I think, additionally, that 
the bonding company, by executing the final agreement, which 
according to my analysis, settled the claims there against 
the government at something less than 15 cents on the dollar 
rather than pursue the appeals, certainly substantially 
prejudices any right that Mrs. Nelson has to proceed in 
any way to cover herself. 
She is given absolutely no opportunity to 
protect herself in this situation. The bonding company 
went ahead and did it without an even attempt at contacting 
her. And under those circumstances it seems to me 
unconscionable, to say the least, that they should now be 
able to come back to Mrs. Nelson and say, "You pay." To 
me this was a total waiver of any responsibility that they 
had in her, of all their actions that they took after this, 
and I certainly don't think thereVs any doubt but that a 
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1 I contract, even one such as the plaintiff sues on here, car. 
2 a be itiOdified by the actions of the parties thereto. Ar.d 
3 
I 
4 
5 
6 
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it's quite apparent here that the bonding company never 
They were looking to Keith Nelson, and I think Mrs. Nelson 
ought to be dismissed out. 
THE COURT: In connection with your motion, 
7
 I the Court finds that on September 17, 1973 the defendant, 
8 I Maureen Nelson, was the wife of the defendant, Keith R. Nelson 
9 | that she knew of a job that Mr. Nelson was about to engage 
in at Stapleton airport in his contracting business; that 
in connection with that job and his application for bonding 
on that job, an indemnity agreement" was submitted by 
Mr. Nelson to Mrs. Nelson, which she signed. 
The Court would find that she had no particular 
knowledge or understanding as to its contents or implications 
** I The Court would further find that there is no evidence in 
16 I the record to indicate that she was involved actively or 
27 J directly in the business of the defendant, Keith Nelson, 
and finds that she was a typical housewife. 
The court finds that she signed the indemnity 
agreement, which did not have limitations as to duration. 
The Court observes that paragraph No. 11 of 
the indemnity agreement, Exhibit 1-P, does in fact waive 
notice of default. 
23 I However, the Court further observes and finds 
24 I that paragraph 13 of the indemnity agreement in Exhibit 1-P 
25 | has contained in it a right which is set forth where the 
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indemnitor can use the surety to litigate any claim or demand 
involved and request that a defense be asserted,. Implicit 
in that particular prevision is some requirement cf notice, 
otherwise the provisions of the indemnity agreement would 
have no meaning. 
The Court would find that in connection with 
the contracts at Stapleton International Airport, that 
Mrs. Nelson knew of the jobs but had no particular intimate 
knowledge of details or particular claims then involved 
in these matters. 
There is some substantial doubt as to whether 
she did receive notice. However, she did have mailed to 
her a letter of November 19, 19 75 by American Bonding Company 
a written notice of general claims which is set forth in 
the Exhibit 7-P. The Court would conclude that that notice 
on its face is insufficient to satisfy the intent of the 
indemnity agreement. 
It simply recites generally that claims have 
been asserted against the bending company in connection 
with these jobs. The letter itself does not state who the 
claimants are, does not indicate the amounts of the claims, 
the nature of the claims, doesn't indicate the peril in 
which the indemnitors find themselves, and the Court would 
conclude that one cannot be intelligently put on notice 
from that letter as to what it is they are defending on, 
so would conclude that that does not satisfy the reasonable 
intent of the agreement. Accordingly, I would grant the 
motion to dismiss Mrs. Nelson. 
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Given that background, I've gone through the 
record in reasonable detail, and I dcn't mean these 
recitations as being sufficient to contain all the necessary 
and will look to the attorneys to add the necessary detail 
to what I generally outline as the Court's decision. 
As is pointed out in Mr. Norton's summary/ 
7
 I during the second day of trial, Maureen Nelson moved for 
8 I dismissal. The motion was granted by the Court. The Court 
9 J found then and continues to find that timely notice of defaul^ 
was given both Keith andMaureen Nelson as prescribed by 
the master indemnity agreement, or agreements to which they 
were a party. The Court concluded that the notice itself 
was vague and insufficient to afford reasonable notice to 
Maureen Nelson to intelligently form any rational basis for 
deciding whether she should exercise her right under paragraph 
15 | 13 of the blanket indemnity agreement to defend or to 
16 I prosecute any particular claims that Triple A Electric might 
have had against the United States Government, which would 
either avoid or reduce liability as against her as an 
indemnitor. 
The Court would find that even though 
Maureen Nelson was an indemnitor in all respects to contact, 
as was her husband, she was treated very differently than 
her husband, Keith Nelson, as an indemnitor. Keith Nelson 
23 | was kept involved and informed of the efforts to resolve 
24 J the problems and settlement of the construction and all 
oc u related issues pertaining to the ILS and ALS contracts in 
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question. He was informed on the terms of the takeover 
agreement and was signatory thereto* He and his attorney, 
James Kreutz, were advised of the final settlement terms 
underlying facts supporting his claim for offsets. He had 
reviewed them with counsel and he had the opportunity of 
settling or pursuing the claims independently if he saw 
fit. 
On the other hand, the record is silent as 
to any efforts made by American Bonding and Farmers Home 
Mutual to ascertain how to keep Maureen Nelson informed 
or to ascertain what information, if any, she was receiving. 
There was no. evidence that she was given' any opportunity 
to be a party to the takeover agreement, and was not a party 
to the takeover agreement specifically. There is no evidence 
that the settlement agreement entered between the FAA and 
the sureties was presented to her for approval, and there 
is no evidence that she was advised of the terms thereof, 
as was Keith Nelson. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes,as a matter 
of law, that under such circumstances she cannot be bound 
as an indemnitor. Much of the difficulty experienced in 
terms of reviewing the issues between the sureties and 
Triple A Electric Service and Keith Nelson came about 
primarily because of the way the case was presented. 
The case presented by Triple A Electric and 
Keith Nelson on their counterclaim for some $142,000 for 
extras was presented through the oral testimony of 
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A. DENNIS NORTON, ESQ. (A2425) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN § MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff American 
Bonding Company 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEITH R. NELSON and AAA JUDGMENT 
ELECTRIC SERVICE, KEITH R. 
NELSON, an individual and 
MAUREEN NELSON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
KEITH R. NELSON, dba AAA Civil No. C79-5195 
ELECTRIC SERVICE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS HOME MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant, Counter-
claimant, and Third 
Party Plaintiff, 
T?vVi -l K-i +- T? 
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The Court, having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law in the above-entitled matter, now enters its judgment as 
follows: 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The claims by American Bonding Company and Farmers Home 
Mutual Insurance Company against Maureen Nelson be, and the same 
hereby are, dismissed with prejudice, 
2. American Bonding Company and Farmers Home Mutual Insurance 
Company be, and the same hereby are, awarded judgment against 
Keith R. Nelson dba AAA Electric Service and Keith R. Nelson, 
an individual, in sum of $38,257.37 plus interest at six percent (6%) 
per annum from and after October 17, 1978 to date of Judgment, and 
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum 
thereafter, plus costs of suit. 
DATED this 13th day of December, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Kenneth Rigtrup 
Kenneth Rigtrup, Third District Judge 
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A. DENNIS NORTON, ESQ. (A2425) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff American 
Bonding Company 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY, a 
corporation/ 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
KEITH R. NELSON dba AAA 
ELECTRIC SERVICE, KEITH R. 
NELSON, an individual and 
MAUREEN NELSON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
KEITH R. NELSON, dba AAA 
ELECTRIC SERVICE, 
Plaintiff, 
-V-
Civil No. C79-5195 
FARMERS HOME MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant, Counter-
claimant and Third 
Party Plaintiff, 
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MAUREEN NELSON, 
Third Party 
Defendant. 
Upon Motion of the Court, the above-entitled cause came 
on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, 
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, 
at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 8th 
day of July, 1985, at 8:30 a.m. Present at the hearing was John 
L. McCoy in behalf of AAA Electric Service, Keith R. Nelson and 
Maureen Nelson, and A. Dennis Norton in behalf of American Bonding 
Company and Farmers Home Mutual Insurance Company. The Court, 
having previously tried the matter, announced from the bench its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Timely notice of default was given to both Keith Nelson 
and Maureen Nelson as prescribed by the Agreement of Indemnity 
(General) to which they were indemnitors. 
2. Notice to Maureen Nelson was vague and insufficient 
and therefore did not afford reasonable notice to her so as to 
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intelligently form any rational basis for deciding whether she 
should exercise her right under paragraph 13 of the Agreement 
of Indemnity (General) to defend or to prosecute any particular 
claims that AAA Electric might have had against the United States 
Government in order to avoid or reduce liability against her as 
an indemnitor. 
3. Keith Nelson was kept involved and informed of the efforts 
by American Bonding Company to resolve the problems and settlement 
of the construction and all related issues pertaining to the ILS 
and ALS contracts in question. Keith Nelson was also informed 
of the terms of the take-over agreement and was a signatory thereto. 
Keith Nelson and his attorney, James Cruz, were advised of the final 
settlement terms with the United States, and Keith Nelson had 
knowledge of the underlying facts supporting his claim for offsets. 
Mr. Nelson had reviewed such facts with his counsel, and he had 
the opportunity of settling or pursuing the claims independently 
if he saw fit. 
4. The record is silent as to efforts made by American 
Bonding Company and Farmers Home Mutual Insurance Company to 
ascertain how to keep Maureen Nelson informed or to ascertain 
what information, if any, she was receiving. The record is also 
silent as to any opportunity she was given to be a party to the 
take-over agreement, and Maureen Nelson was not a party to the 
take-over agreements, nor was it submitted to her for approval 
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or was she advised of the terms thereof by American Bonding 
Company. 
5. The sureties had no obligation to finance the cost of 
pursuing AAA Electric Claims against others. 
6. Keith Nelson, d/b/a AAA Electric Company, could have 
pursued his claims against the United States and others through 
his own retained attorney, Jim Cruz, or through another attorney, 
and could have attempted arrangements to post adequate security 
and request the sureties to pursue such claims, Keith Nelson, 
d/b/a AAA Electric, chose not to do either, and therefore cannot 
be heard to complain about the sureties' settlement with the 
United States, 
7. The sureties acted in good faith in paying claims and 
in marketing disbursements on such claims, and as to those claims 
supported by vouchers, they should be reimbursed, such vouchers 
constituting prima facie evidence of liability by the indemnitors 
to the sureties. 
8. The sureties paid claims and legal expenses pursuant to 
its bond obligations in this case in sum of $180,759.33, less 
recoveries from the United States of $93,091.96, resulting in a 
net loss of $87,667.37 to sureties. 
9. The U. S. Government claimed offsetting damages and re-
procurement costs against Keith Nelson d/b/a AAA Electric Company 
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of Sixty One Thousand Four Hundred Ten Dollars ($61,410.00). 
No underlying vouchers, work sheets, ledgers or any kind of 
documentation was offered by any party in this case in support 
of such offsetting claim. Mr. Vanatta was the attorney repre-
senting the sureties in settlement negotiations with the United 
States. He testified during trial in this case that he did not 
now remember the specific nature of the Government claims, al-
though he had detailed work sheets in Denver regarding the U.S. 
Government offsets. Mr. Vanatta testified that during negotia-
tions with the U.S. Government, he expended considerable time 
and efforts in reviewing the offsets, but no documentation was 
produced in this case concerning such claimed offsets by the U.S. 
Government. No documents were produced by any party relating to 
the U.S. Government offset. For lack of documentary evidence, 
the Court finds that it cannot judge the good faith efforts or 
fundamental soundness of the decision by these sureties to accept 
the U.S. Government claim damage and reprocurement cost figure of 
Sixty One Thousand Four Hundred Ten Dollars ($61,410.00) , not-
withstanding Mr. Vanatta1s testimony that at the time of settle-
ment, and at the time of trial, his considered opinion was that 
the settlement was reasonable under the circumstances. 
10. The sureties are entitled to judgment against Keith 
Nelson d/b/a AAA Electric Company for the disbursement amounts 
of Eighty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Seven Dollars Thirty 
Seven Cents ($87,667.37), less U.S. Government reprocurement 
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costs not detailed in this case of Sixty One Thousand Four 
Hundred Ten Dollars ($61,410.00), or a net Judgment in favor 
of sureties of Twenty Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Seven 
Dollars Thirty Seven Cents ($26,257.37) plus Six percent (6%) 
per annum interest from and after October 17, 19 78 to date of 
Judgment. 
11. The attorneys' fees of $19,466.29 paid to Mr. Vanatta's 
law firm in the handling of the bond claim are recoverable under 
the Agreement of Indemnity (General), are reasonable for the 
services rendered, and sureties should recover for such fees. 
Said attorneys fees are included in the sureties' net loss amount 
of $87,667.37. 
12. The fees charged by the firm of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau for costs and legal services incurred through the efforts 
of A. Dennis Norton incident to prosecution of this case are 
similarly recoverable and reasonable, especially in light of the 
complexity and length of the case, and the Court finds Twelve 
Thousand Dollars ($12,000,000) to be a reasonable fee to be 
awarded in favor of the sureties and against the Defendant Keith 
Nelson d/b/a AAA Electric Company thru trial of this matter. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court having now made its Findings of Fact, now concludes 
as a matter of law as follows: 
1. The Defendant Maureen Nelson should not be bound as an 
Indemnitor. 
2. The Takeover Agreement between AAA Electric, American 
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Bonding Company and the U.S. Government by its terms assigned the 
extra work claim by AAA Electric to the sureties only to the 
extent necessary to indemnify the sureties, and Keith Nelson 
d/b/a AAA Electric had the power to prosecute on its own claims 
against the U.S. Government in excess of that amount, or to have 
the sureties prosecute such claims by depositing sufficient 
collateral with the sureties. 
3. The sureties had no obligation to finance the cost of 
pursuing the AAA Electric claims against any other contracting 
party. Keith Nelson d/b/a AAA Electric had a right under the 
Settlement Agreement of October 17, 1978, since he was not a 
signatory thereto, to undertake further actions on his claimed 
extras or to contest the U.S. Government offets, although the 
sureties had a right to indemnify and hold harmless the U.S. 
Government upon event of such assertive claims. 
4. The sureties are entitled to Judgment against the 
Defendant Keith Nelson d/b/a AAA Electric for the sum of Eighty 
Seven Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Seven Dollars Thirty Seven Cents 
($87,667.37), less U.S. Government reprocurement costs of Sixty 
One Thousand Four Hundred Ten Dollars ($61,410.00), leaving a net 
amount owing of Twenty Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Seven Dollars 
Thirty Seven Cents ($26,257.37), plus Twelve Thousand Dollars 
($12,000.00) attorneys1 fees by reason of prosecution of this case 
by the firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, or a total of 
Thirty Eight Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Seven Dollars Thirty Seven 
Cents ($38,257.37) owing plus interest at the rate of Six percent 
(6%) per annum from and after October 17, 1978. 
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^/A Isecf/rtltr 
DATED t h i s j3J^ day of Otrbeber, 1985 
BY THE COURT: 
/C^/p/pifW^ fc^y y^u?& 
Kenneth Rigtrup, Third d i s t r i c t Judge 
Approved as to form: 
John McCoy 
Attorneys for Keith R. Nelson and 
Maureen Nelson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
A. Dennis Norton 
Attorneys for American Bonding Co. & 
Farmers Home Mutual Insurance Co. 
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